In California, a new Facebook feature which permits an advertiser to publish or broadcast a user’s “like” of its product to others in that individual’s circle is under scrutiny.

The United States District Court in San Jose, California refused to grant a motion to dismiss which states that Facebook ads violate its user’s right of publicity by utilizing their names and photographs without authorization. However, the court dismissed an unjust enrichment claim. In the lawsuit, Facebook’s position is that user permission is not required to promote its user’s likes to those in that user’s circle, in a category it terms “sponsored stories.” Facebook contends that such information is newsworthy and exempted under California’s right-of-publicity statute. The company’s position is that its users constitute public figures.

California’s right-of-publicity statute is codified under Civil Code section 3344 which states as follows:

In the recent years, online harassment or cyberharassment has become an important issue. This is because the Internet has changed our lives on so many levels. Generally, the law prohibits harassment and our readers should consider taking certain precautions when being harassed.

Cyberharassment is different from cyberstalking because it does not involve a credible threat. Cyberharassment occurs when someone sends harassing email messages, instant messages, or posts entries simply to torment another person. Different jurisdictions have different approaches in addressing cyberharassment in codifying their laws. For example, some include language addressing electronic communications in general harassment statutes. However, some states have created stand-alone cyberharassment statutes.

California Penal Code section 653.2(a) states that, “[e]very person who, with intent to place another person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of the other person’s immediate family, by means of an electronic communication device, and without consent of the other person, and for the purpose of imminently causing that other person unwanted physical contact, injury, or harassment, by a third party, electronically distributes, publishes, e-mails, hyperlinks, or makes available for downloading, personal identifying information, including, but not limited to, a digital image of another person, or an electronic message of a harassing nature about another person, which would be likely to incite or produce that unlawful action, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in a county jail, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.

In California, the stalking laws are included under Section 646.9 of the Penal Code, which states that any person who willfully and maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety or that of an immediate family member is guilty of stalking. Stalking cases may include additional related charges such as: (1) Trespassing; (2) Vandalism; (3) Burglary; (4) Criminal Threats; and (5) Obscene, Threatening, or Annoying Phone Calls.

Please keep in mind that willfulness is a standard related to the culprit’s state of mind. For example, when the person is acting purposefully, then he/she has the “conscious object” of engaging in conduct and believes or hopes that the attendant circumstances exist. If the person is acting knowingly, then he/she is practically certain that his conduct will lead to the result. If the person is acting recklessly, then he/she is aware that the attendant circumstances exist, but nevertheless engages in the conduct that a “law-abiding person” would have refrained from. If the person acts negligently, then he/she is unaware of the attendant circumstances and the consequences of his conduct, but a “reasonable person” would have been aware. Finally, if the person acts with strict liability, then mental state is irrelevant and he/she is strictly liable.

In the last few years and with the emerging of the world wide web, a new kind of stalking has developed which is also called “cyber stalking.” This type of misconduct occurs when the violator utilizes the Internet, electronic mail (e-mail) or other communication devices to harass and stalk others. For example, it can occur by sending e-mails to the victim, impersonating another person in online chat rooms and e-mail messages, and disseminating lies in cyberspace. It is also important to note that the Internet is a cheap and efficient method for “cyber stalkers” to anonymously cause harm to their victims.

If you use email in your day-to-day business operations the CAN-SPAM Act is a law that sets the rules for commercial email. It also establishes the requirements for commercial messages, provides recipients the right to have the sender stop emailing them, and mentions the penalties for related violations.

The CAN-SPAM Act applies to bulk email and all commercial messages, which the law defines as “any electronic mail message the primary purpose of which is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial product or service,” including email that promotes content on commercial websites. The law makes no exception for business-to-business email which means all email. As an example, a message to former customers announcing a new product line is required to comply with the law.

Each violation of the CAN-SPAM Act is subject to penalties of up to $16,000. Here are the CAN-SPAM Act’s main requirements:

In light of the circumstances, numerous states have enacted “cyberstalking” or “cyberharassment” laws or currently possess laws that specifically include electronic forms of communication within more traditional stalking or harassment laws. In addition, many states have enacted “cyberbullying” laws in reaction to issues related to protecting minors from online bullying or harassment.

Cyberstalking constitutes use of the world-wide-web (i.e., the Internet), electronic mail or other electronic communications to stalk. It generally refers to a pattern of threatening or malicious behaviors. It may be considered the most dangerous of the three types of Internet harassment, based on a posing credible threat of harm. Penalties range from misdemeanor to felony. See Cal. Civil Code § 1708.7, Cal. Penal Code § 646.9.

Cyberharassment is different from cyberstalking since it may not involve a credible threat. It usually pertains to threatening or harassing email messages, instant messages, or to blog entries or websites dedicated solely to tormenting a person. Some state legislatures have dealt with this issue by inserting provisions which address electronic communications in general harassment statutes, while others have created stand-alone cyberharassment statutes. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 422, 653.2, and 653m.

Samsung Electronics, the second largest maker of mobile phones, claims that Apple Inc. has infringed upon its patents since entering the mobile-phone market with the iPhone 3G, a lawyer for Samsung told a Dutch court as the Korean company seeks a ban on some Apple products in the Netherlands.

“Apple just entered the market in 2008 without taking care of the licenses,” Bas Berghuis van Woortman, a lawyer for Simmons & Simmons LLP who represents Samsung, said in The Hague court. “Apple is consciously, structurally infringing the 3G patents.”

The parties will be discussing settlement soon as this is yet another legal battle between two technology giants over intellectual property rights.

In the recent years, numerous Internet forums (aka “online message boards”) have provided a place for Internet users to discuss issues, entities/companies, and persons or individuals, who are often disguised in some form of anonymity. Sometimes, the targets of disparaging comments react by filing lawsuits in state or federal courts against unidentified (“John Doe”) defendants for claims such as violation of securities laws, breach of confidentiality agreement, and libel. Generally, in such disputes subpoenas are submitted to the message board hosts so to identify the authors. Notwithstanding the various challenges, the courts differ in their treatment of such subpoenas.

For example, see Jon Hart & Michael Rothberg, Anonymous Internet Postings Pit Free Speech Against Accountability, WSJ.com (March 6, 2002).

In Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) Mobilisa, a communications company, filed a complaint against numerous “John Doe” defendants who had submitted an anonymous e-mail to Mobilisa’s management team about the company’s founder and CFO’s conducts. Thereafter, Mobilisa attempted to compel The Suggestion Box, which was the service provider through which the e-mail was submitted, so to obtain the person’s identity who had submitted the e-mail. The trial court granted Mobilisa’s request and ordered The Suggestion Box to reveal the identities of the anonymous senders. Thereafter, The Suggestion Box and the senders of the e-mail appealed the trial court’s decision.

Pursuant to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, no provider of an interactive computer service may be treated as the publisher of information provided by another information content provider. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.

Generally, holding a website operator as the publisher of an allegedly libelous statement by a third party violates the Act. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). Accordingly, the standard pursuant to Zeran is that when an online service provider receives a retraction demand regarding statements the service provider did not write, the demanding party should be re-directed to the third-party originator (i.e., the person who originally wrote the defamatory statement).

California’s Retraction Statute under Cal. Civ. Code § 48a states that:

A defamatory statement is one that injures the reputation of another. The common-law torts of libel and slander punish the publication of statements that are both defamatory and false. Generally, a libelous statement is a false and defamatory statement published in writing. A slanderous statement is a false and defamatory statement expressed orally. False and defamatory oral statements broadcasted over the radio or television are now widely considered libel, rather than slander. In some cases, money damages may be awarded to compensate the victim of libel or slander for the reputational injury caused by publication of the false and defamatory statement.

However, in recent years there has been significant tension between the common-law protections of reputation and the mandate of the First Amendment to the Constitution that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . .”

To ensure that debate on public issues remains “uninhibited, robust and wide-open,” New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), the United States Supreme Court has found that the First Amendment limits the circumstances under which a speaker or publisher may be punished for making false and defamatory statements: “Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment . . . [b]ut to insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968).

The issue of online service provider liability comes up often in today’s high-tech world. In order to promote free discussion and private investment in the Internet, the United States Congress immunized providers of “interactive computer service[s]” against liability arising out of content provided for publication by any other “information content provider.” See Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230. This section does not limit the application of intellectual property laws or criminal laws, but it protects Internet service providers and website operators against a broad range of tort, contract, and other claims arising out of content created by third parties.

Section 230(c)(2)(A) states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of…any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”

Section 230(c)(2)(B), provides immunity for “any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to [such material].” The immunity offered under Section 230(c)(2) is also referred to as the “Good Samaritan” protection.