Internet Lawyer Blog

Pursuant to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, no provider of an interactive computer service may be treated as the publisher of information provided by another information content provider. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.

Generally, holding a website operator as the publisher of an allegedly libelous statement by a third party violates the Act. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). Accordingly, the standard pursuant to Zeran is that when an online service provider receives a retraction demand regarding statements the service provider did not write, the demanding party should be re-directed to the third-party originator (i.e., the person who originally wrote the defamatory statement).

California’s Retraction Statute under Cal. Civ. Code § 48a states that:

A defamatory statement is one that injures the reputation of another. The common-law torts of libel and slander punish the publication of statements that are both defamatory and false. Generally, a libelous statement is a false and defamatory statement published in writing. A slanderous statement is a false and defamatory statement expressed orally. False and defamatory oral statements broadcasted over the radio or television are now widely considered libel, rather than slander. In some cases, money damages may be awarded to compensate the victim of libel or slander for the reputational injury caused by publication of the false and defamatory statement.

However, in recent years there has been significant tension between the common-law protections of reputation and the mandate of the First Amendment to the Constitution that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . .”

To ensure that debate on public issues remains “uninhibited, robust and wide-open,” New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), the United States Supreme Court has found that the First Amendment limits the circumstances under which a speaker or publisher may be punished for making false and defamatory statements: “Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment . . . [b]ut to insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968).

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment limits common-law defamation claims brought by public officials. The Court held that to recover for publication of a defamatory falsehood, a public official must prove that the challenged statement was “of and concerning” the public official plaintiff, that the statement was false, and that the defendant acted with “actual malice.” The Court defined “actual malice” as publication with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether the statement was false or not.

Later, the Supreme Court extended the standard announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to defamation cases brought by “public figures.” Public figures include individuals who voluntarily inject themselves into public controversy, as well as those who are involuntarily thrust into the limelight, even if only with respect to a particular activity or incident.

A private-figure defamation plaintiff can recover damages based on the defendant’s negligence (or a more speech-protective standard, under the law of some states). In no instance, however, can a private-figure plaintiff recover damages for defamation without a showing of fault amounting to, at least, negligence. Any lesser standard, the Supreme Court concluded, would unduly burden free speech. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). And, at least when the speech relates to an issue of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff must bear the burden of proving falsity; the defendant speaker is not obligated to prove the truth of the challenged statements. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768 (1986).